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Nielsen (1981) challenges philosophers to examine the nature of philo-
sophy. He criticizes them for adhering to 'philosophy for ?hiloso~hy's' sake 
and po ints out the non-neutrality of philosophy. Nielsen and other radical 
philosophers ask: In what sense are the concep t s and distinctions wnich 
philosophers address ' ordinary '? What are the socie tal influences on the 
formation of their discourse? What are the societal consequences of their 
discourse? Can philosophy be conceived in such a way as to perform a crit-
ical service t o society? and In what ways does or should philosophy inter-
face with other disciplines? 
Tayl or (1978) raises similar questions and argues that the concept of 
'art ' is detrimental to the furtherance of an equi t able society: 
What I am suggesting is that limited areas of the conceptual 
system work adversely against people's interest . It is my conten-
tion that the concept of art and attendant concept s work in this 
'Jay (p . ll). 
In this paper I will: a) outline the arguments which radical philosophers 
bring against mainstream philosophy; b) delineate their views on the nature 
of phi l osophical criticism; and c) discuss Taylor ' s applicstion of this 
view to the concept of art . I will attempt to be descriptive in my state-
ment of their views. However, to the extent that I employ logic or conceptual 
analysis, i t should be understood that I am not, thereby, advocating that 
these methodological approaches are or should form the nature of philosophi-
cal criticism. 
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The group of philosophers, who in 1972 forced the Radical Philosophy 
Group and began publishing the journal of Radical Philosophy . are not uniform 
in their beliefs and/or approaches. Yet, there are some common threads which 
bind them together. These are the rejection of mainstream philosophers' 
tendency to: a) assume that philosophy itself needs no j ustification; b) 
view philosophy as neutral with respect to moral and practical issuesj c) ob-
sc~re the ideological role of philosophy; d) uncritically subscribe to 
scientisffi; e) uphold exclusive 'professionalism' and f) work in a socio-
historical vacuum. On the posit:.ive Side. they are held together by a "ief.J 
of phil osophical criticism which encompasses: a) a cornmittment to philosophy's 
function as "a weapon of criticism in an attempt to raise consciousness--a 
consciousness which will see the need for and the possibility of a socialist 
future" (Nielsen. 1981. p. 88); b) addressing actual problems of people and 
not solely pr oblems of philosophers ; c) a belief in the importance of teach-
ing philosophy to the non- specialist; d) attempting to gain a systematic view 
of human reality rather than a piecemeal one; e) unswerving ccmmittment to 
examining the ideological role of philosophy; and f) avoiding the separation 
of political convictions and philosophical work. A central point of the rad-
ical philosophers is that philosophy necessarily serves some socia-political 
ends and that choosing such ends, r ather than having them dictated by others, 
15 a central r esponsibility of philoaophers. Their arguments on this issue 
; 
involve a distinction between 'objectivity' and 'neutrality'. As Nielsen 
states: 
It is objectivity and a respect for truth that is important not 
neutrality . We should take to hear t in this context C. Wr ight 
}1ill's remarks about his own study of the Narxists! "r have tried 
• 
to be objective, I do not claim to be detached" (1981, p. 86). 
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Rather than proceeding with a description of what radical philosopher's 
say about the nature of philosophical criticism, I will proceed to examine 
the instances of this view in the work of Taylor (1978). This approach is, 
itsel f, a crucial part of the radical philosopher's view of philosophical 
criticism. Not only is effort spent discussing the nature of philosophical 
criticism suspect, the uncovering of the ideological function of an approach 
and it's growth and change are more likely to ensue from observing the ways 
in which it structures particular issues. 
Taylor is aware that the utility of adding yet another volume to the 
writings on art must be examined. Given his claim that "art and philosophy 
are enemies of the people" (1978, p. 2). one might indeed challenge his grounds 
for writing a book which focuses on these subjects. Taylor's justification 
is that he wishes to "arm the masses" against art and philosophy: 
As things stand, the masses, somewhat shamefacedly, ignore art and 
philosophy; I wish to stir up an arrogant awareness of and resistance 
to these activities (1978, p. 2). 
Taylor goes on to ask the reader, whom he hopes is the masses, to make 
allowances for the style and vocabulary which have necessarily been ingrained 
by his academic background. He stresses that he will try not to be condescend-
ing or affected in his writing. However, as I will argue later, Taylor's 
superficial treatment of the concept of art proves to be both. 
It is the second chapter of Taylor's book which focuses upon examining 
the concept of art. Chapter three is intended specifically for those- in-
teres ted in how his view fits with Marxist views of art and chapter four 
is limited to examining art and jazz. Taylor begins chapter two, "Correcting 
Mistaken Ideas About Art and Culture", by stressing that our tastes in and 
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definitions of art are influenced by non-art related factors. He makes an 
analogy with the factors that have influenced our taste in and view of bread: 
We might compare, here, the ,.;ay in which something becomes established 
as a work of art, or the way someone becomes established as a great 
artist, or great critic, with the way in which a commercial product 
establishes itself as successful. For instance, the pre-packed, 
sliced loaf which we all eat would generally be accounted inferior 
to the cottage industry-type load, which these days is generally not 
available. The modern loaf has replaced the apparently more desired, 
older loaf, not on the basis of its acknowledged superiority as bread, 
but as the result of various other social factors, including highly 
competitive pricing, superior distribution services, the thinness of 
slices and the economy therein, the addition of preservatives to 
avoid staleness, etc .. (1978, pp. 31-2). 
This analogy echoes Dickie's (1968) institutional view of art and, similarily, 
leaves the issue of how the concept of art originally came into existence un-
answered. Yet, before proceeding to examining the history of the concept of 
art, Taylor stops to make another point. He invokes a hypothetical which is 
aimed at showing the futility of trying to counter an eli test concept of art 
with a concept of revolutionary or mass art. His claim is that the concept 
art, itself, is the culprit. 
Taylor asks the reader to imagine a future group attempting to discover 
f , 
why the twentieth century upper class seemed unable to grasp the concept of 
art. This group might propose that, because of certain class experiences, 
the upper class was prevented from understanding the true definition of art. 
(The reverse arguement is, or course, often used to ' explain' difficulties 
which the lower class qave in understanding art). At this point, Taylor 
69 
remarks that, although this hypothetical does bring Out the social influences 
on the concept of art , it also promotes the mistaken view that all cultures 
will arrive at Some definition of art. Th d 1 . ~ e un er y~ng assumption is that 
art picks out some aspect of human activity which all cultures would delineate . 
Taylor rejects this view and argues that art is a historical concept which 
has certain socio-economic functions but which does not refer to some essential 
human activity. He criticizes }~rx and his followers for not recognizing this 
point and for treat ing art differently than they treat concepts such as re-
ligi on , the Stat e and Law: 
To understand the Stat~, for ~~rx, one has to follow the story of 
its development. When we turn to Marx's treatment of art the 
historical method, he uses e lsewhere, disappears. • . f U 
L .... rt 1.5, or .'"larx, 
some fundamental human dimension. Thi i 5 comm ttment to art, as some-
thing basic and universal, leads Marx to positions at odds with the 
fac ts (1978, p . 35). 
Tayl or 's account of the 'facts' which counter the universality of art arc, 
by his own admittance, sparse. 
Taylor begins his historical analysis by citing Kristeller (1951; 1952) 
in support of the view that "it is onl y in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centurieS th~t the modern system of the arts emerges" (Taylor, 1978, p.39). 
Taylor recognizes that making this claim solely on the basis of Kristeller's 
history of ideas is proble~at1c in that what people say about a particular 
time period may be a variance with what actually happened. He cites as cross-
checks archeological . suPPOrt for the absence of art galleries and educational 
institutions which separated the arts and sciences as we know them. Unfor-
tunately, this is the extent of his cross-checking and he does not cite 
sources for those cross-checks which he does include. 
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From this brie f analysis, Taylor claims that, with respect to the concept 
of arc, there is a historical divide around the seventeenth century. He 
suggests that this divide can be explained in terms of the growing dominance 
of the bourgeoise and the concommitant rise of scier-ce. Taylor's chesis is 
that art was a form of life circumscribed by the aristocracy in order to 
maintain their separation from and superiority over the emerging bourgeoise 
who had transformed those acr.ivities now labeled 'scientific'. Through 
the use of the concept of art, the aristoc~acy elevated certain activities 
of the old form of life which had not yet been transformed by the bourgeoise. 
Furthermore, these ac tivities -were put forth as communicative 'of truer. by 
which was meant the reinforcing of the old cosmological and social order. 
The bourgeoise reacted to this by developing a view of art as evoki~g pleas-
ure and as a matter of taste . Hewever, as they rose to power, this vague 
and rather democratic , .. iew of art gave way to theories of art which · .... ould 
maintain their own class position. Taylor views all subsequent aesthetic 
theories as attempts to rationalize the bourgeoise's changing needs for 
the category of art. 
Although Taylor's interpretation of the development of the concept of 
art may be useful for sensitizing us to the function of aesthetic theories, 
the basis for his interpretations are not adequately supported. He ~akes his 
interpretations on the basis of a few references to Hauser (1962) with no 
other supporting information. His two 'anthropological' examples do not alter 
this situation. They do suggest that other cultures may not subscribe to the 
view of art as museum contemplation. however , cultural activity which con-
forms to other definitions of art are unaccounted for. Taylor's failure to 
give an indepth histor. cal account of the ',ariety of views of art which have 
been advanced leaves the reader without the needed 'weapons' t o counter 
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those who wish to continue claiming art as a universal human need . Given 
that Tayl or could adequately prove that the concept of art is a category 
with does not access any human need bu t is solel y used for . perpetuat~ng class 
distinctions and forms of l i fe , we are still left wi th the possibility that 
activities which have mistakenly been gr ouped under this concept may desig-
nate cer tain human essentials. For example, we migh t admit that the pro-
duction of visual symbols which communicated feelings should not be classi-
tied as ' art ' and, yet , argue that this activity is an essential part of hu-
man culture . 
At this point. Taylor mi ght reply t hat, although this may he true , he 
i s solely concerned wi th pointing out the function of the concep t of art . 
Yet, by ignoring the particulars of the experiences de trimen t aly labeled as 
' art' , we th d f r un e anger a throwing t he baby out with the bath water. Fur-
thermore, a failur e t o cover this material reflects a d con escending attitude 
towards the masses. Not only is Taylor condescending in his assumption 
that t he scanty historical information which he provides will suffice to con-
vince t he masses of his in terpretation, he is also condescending in his assump-
t ion that t he masses ha'le accepted the "oncept of ~ art solely because they a r e 
intimidated by it. I suspect that the process is much more complicated 
than this and revolves , in part , around t he fact that aspects of aes t hetic theor-
ies do address essential human needs. A b t any rate, y not addressing such 
issues, Taylor provides them with no information for arming them for or 
against t hose who will point ou t the intricacies of the concepts t ha t are 
involved in discuss i ons about so-called art ac tivities . To assume tha t the 
masses will be satisfies with an "arrogant awar eness " is t o fail to give 
them c r edit as rational human beings. 
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How. then , does Taylor's wo r k measure up to the criteri a outlined by 
~ielsen and other radical philosopher 's ? Clearly Taylor seems committed t o 
examining actual problems of people and to r a iSing consciousness . However, 
his understanding of these actual problems appears to need revision. More 
importantly, Taylor has wandered from a number of the committments which the 
radical philosopher's stress. For example, he does not provide a systemat i c 
view ~hich places the history of t he concept of art ~ithin a system of other 
conceptual development nor does he adequately rely upon information from 
history. sociology, anthropology. psychology, and so forth. In addition, he 
does not address or ackno~ledge the kind of society which he is committed to 
bringing about . Perhaps this concentration on critique rather than devel op-
ment is at the r oo t of his failure t o address potential issues of human 
need which may have arisen out of the, admittedly detrimental, focus on 'art'. 
In sum, Taylor's work does not live up to the standards proposed by the 
radica l philosopher's. Yet, it is a step in that direction--a direction 
which art educators have ye t to explore. 
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